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Society and Public Policy

“Making Workers’ Lives Easier, Not Harder”: The Social Model of Disability and the Caregiver’s Right to Reasonable Accommodation in Italian Courts

Author: Evan Rago, ALL Member, Former Visiting PhD Researcher at the Assisting Living and Learning (ALL) Institute, Maynooth University, PhD Candidate at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia), Italy.

Disability rights extend beyond individual experiences of discrimination. But how far does the protection of the law reach? This blogpost examines discrimination by association and how Italian courts have interpreted this principle, following case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). While focusing on Italian case law, the discussion offers broader reflections on the scope of protection against discrimination and the role of reasonable accommodation in advancing the rights of persons with disabilities. Building on a previous discussion of disability rights and reasonable accommodation, which are the core of ALL Institute’s broader research on inclusion, this blog engages with the protection of carers of people with disabilities and persons with a disability themselves.

By order No. 793 of 29 June 2026, the Court of Rimini held that an employer had discriminated against a worker who was the sole caregiver for her severely disabled son. The employer had removed her from the morning shift she had worked for more than twenty-five years. The only alternative offered was a transfer to another store 28 kilometres from her home. The court qualified the conduct as indirect discrimination by association and ordered the permanent restoration of the shifts. This decision represented one of the first applications of the principles established by the CJEU in the Bervidi case and subsequently adopted in Italian case law by the Court of Cassation.

The Rimini order marks the final stretch of a judicial itinerary that necessarily passed through Luxembourg. In Chacón Navas the CJEU first embraced a narrow, medical-individual understanding of disability. The Coleman Judgment marked an important expansion of protection against disability discrimination. The CJEU clarified that the Employment Equality Directive prohibits discrimination not only against persons with disabilities, but also against individuals who experience discrimination because of their association with a person with a disability. Accordingly, a mother who suffers discrimination at work because of her son’s disability may also rely on the Directive’s protection. That extension of protection, however, was confined to direct discrimination, and Article 5 of the Employment Equality Directive regarding reasonable accommodation remained limited to workers with disabilities. After the EU concluded the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), HK Danmark judgment (also analysed by other authors of this blog) recasted disability in bio-psycho-social terms, understanding it as the outcome of interaction between impairments and the barriers that hinder full participation in society. Bervidi carried that development further by holding that indirect discrimination by association is likewise prohibited; and reasonable accommodation may also be owed to a worker who, without having a disability herself, provides the essential part of the care required by her child condition, subject to the limit of disproportionate burden.

The Italian Court of Cassation distilled Bervidi into four principles, to which the Rimini order gives full effect. Firstly, a failure to provide reasonable accommodation is not merely a breach of the accommodation duty; it constitutes indirect discrimination. Secondly, treating different situations in the same way may itself amount to discrimination. In the present case, this meant applying the ordinary shift system without taking any account of the claimant’s caring responsibilities. The relevant comparison is therefore no longer simply with a colleague who has been treated more favourably, but with a worker whose materially different circumstances have been disregarded through formally identical treatment. The court also made clear that measures presented as merely provisional cannot be prolonged for an unreasonably long period. That consideration applied with particular force in the Rimini case, which concerned the withdrawal of an arrangement that had remained in place for more than 25 years. Finally, the employer must engage genuinely with the worker’s requests and bears the burden of proving either that reasonable accommodation was provided or that no such accommodation was possible without imposing a disproportionate burden. Generic business justifications were deemed insufficient. Claims of increased turnover, supported only by informal internal documents, and colleagues’ alleged dissatisfaction, reported only at second hand, did not amount to the “real, objective needs not otherwise resolvable” required by the court. That formula demands evidence that no alternative arrangement could reconcile the employer’s organisational requirements with the worker’s caring responsibilities. The most significant passage of the order concerns the counter-proposal. The proposed transfer was rejected because reasonable accommodations must “make the worker’s life easier, not worse”. This formulation reflects a pivotal premise of the logic of the social model of disability. If disability arises from the interaction between a person’s condition and the barriers hindering participation, accommodation is, by definition, a means of removing those barriers, rather than requiring the individual to adapt to them.

In this case the barrier lay in the organisation of shifts; removing it required an adjustment of working time, one of the most typical forms of reasonable accommodation, expressly contemplated among the “appropriate measures” referred to in Recital 20 of the Employment Equality Directive and recognised by the CJEU since HK Danmark. The employer’s counter-proposal reversed that logic: the organisation of work remained unchanged, while the worker was expected to adapt and, in the meantime, to use the leave available under Law No. 104 of 5 February 1992 -intended to enable her to care for her son- to mitigate the consequences of the employer’s own conduct. The cost of achieving equality was thus shifted onto the worker, turning the individual, once again, into the problem to be addressed. This is precisely the medical-individual understanding of disability from which the CRPD marked a decisive departure. The contrast with a contemporaneous decision is telling. By applying the Pauni judgment , delivered on the same day as Bervidi, the District Court considered any examination of possible accommodations “superfluous” before upholding a dismissal for exceeding the statutory sick-leave limit, thereby limiting its analysis to the worker’s diagnosis. Two courts, ruling only a few months apart, thus reflect opposing paradigms. In this emerging phase of litigation, outcomes may depend not only on the rules being applied, but also -and perhaps more fundamentally-on the model of disability through which the judge interprets them.

A final lesson lies in what the order does not say. The claimant’s position rested on two legally distinct grounds: family care duties as such, protected -following a 2021 reform- by Article 25(2-bis) of Legislative Decree No. 198 of 11 April 2006, as already addressed in this blog, and discrimination by association with her son’s disability under Legislative Decree No. 216 of 9 July 2003, which alone gives rise to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. In the terminology used by the CRPD Committee’s General Comment No. 6, the combination of these two grounds amounts to multiple discrimination. It involves cumulative grounds, each independently sufficient, converging on a single condition: the need for care arises precisely from the disability of the person receiving that care. Yet the order is silent on this dimension, understandably so. Italian anti-discrimination law has developed through layered sectoral interventions, with each protected ground linked to its own substantive and procedural framework. That fragmentation makes it difficult to please multiple or intersectional discrimination within a single action. Multiple discrimination thus struggles to emerge and to receive full protection, a weakness only the legislator can ultimately cure. The Rimini order confirms that anti-discrimination law can shape the organisation of work around the needs not only of persons with disabilities, but also of those who provide them with indispensable care. Far from displacing the person with a disability, this approach protects the very relationship that makes participation possible. Important questions remain unresolved, from the overlap between procedures to the denial of non-pecuniary damages, which risks weakening the remedy’s dissuasive effect. Yet, the direction is clear. From Luxembourg, through the Court of Cassation, to the district courts, the social model of disability is gradually being translated into law-in-action. Nor will that translation stop at the Italian border: Bervidi binds the courts of every Member State, and each of them will have to work out, case by case, what accommodating a caregiver requires in practice. The Italian decisions carry no authority abroad, but they come from the jurisdiction whose Court of Cassation referred the case to Luxembourg and are among the first to take up that task, which makes them an early and concrete point of reference for judges and litigants elsewhere in the Union.